Security firm ThreatFabric published an analysis of Bazuka, a fraud framework targeting Android devices, on its official blog on November 18, 2026. The company says its Mobile Threat Intelligence team came across it in late October 2026 while investigating an app that relays card data over NFC. Bazuka is made up of a core and 23 modules, and the control panel used by its operators includes integration with language models.

A Core and 23 Modules Combine a Wide Range of Fraud Tools

According to ThreatFabric, Bazuka consists of a downloader (or dropper), a core, and 23 modules. The core and modules are DEX files loaded in memory, and they talk to the command-and-control servers over two WebSocket channels encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305.

The modules cover a broad set of functions. The main ones are grouped below.

CategoryMain modules and functions
Input theftinputrecorder (keylogger that extracts card numbers, crypto wallet addresses, and passwords), screencontrol (captures the lock-screen PIN, password, or pattern)
Bypassing authenticationtwofa (captures one-time codes), smsmessage (reads and sends SMS, extracts verification codes)
Remote controloptics (remote control, screencasting, phishing overlays), devicecontrol, selfadb (built-in ADB client)
Stealing moneyclipmonitor (swaps BTC, ETH, TRC20, and SOL addresses in the clipboard for the attacker's), tapread-nfcmodule (contactless bank cards), call_forwarding (call forwarding via USSD)
Data collectionlocation (GPS, cell towers, Wi-Fi), contacts, media (photos, camera, microphone), file_manager
Persistenceuninstallshield (blocks uninstalling or force-stopping), systemchecker (detects analysis environments)

The company notes that Bazuka does not include automated payments.

A Screenshot of the Home Screen Hides What Happens Underneath

One technique ThreatFabric says it had "not seen before" is a screen overlay. Bazuka takes a screenshot of the home screen or lock screen and can display it on top as an overlay on command. While the victim sees what looks like their normal screen, fraudulent activity can proceed in the background.

To obtain permissions, the malware uses Accessibility Services and ADB shell commands. The core can open the settings, turn on Developer options and Wireless Debugging, and intercept the PIN to establish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon. It can also disable Google Play's protection component through Accessibility to avoid detection.

LLMs in the Control Panel Help Pick Victims

What ThreatFabric highlights most is the language model integration in the operators' control panel. It supports both locally hosted models running on a neighboring server and large models accessed through an API. Operators can ask about an infected device for a "score" indicating how attractive it is as a target, or for a strategy for clicking through permission prompts.

The company concludes that AI agents inside the control panel help operators identify victims of interest and manage infections at scale. The panel itself was also full of AI-generated images and videos.

Distributed as Fake Adult and IPTV Apps

ThreatFabric lists two distribution channels: traffers using dedicated landing pages, and Google Play. The dropper it examined posed as an adult app called "TikTok18+", and IPTV apps were also used as lures. The dropper requested minimal permissions and no Accessibility access, a design meant to make it easier to pass Play review. However, the company says it has not seen signs of actual distribution through Google Play.

The routine that searches for on-screen elements supports Russian, English, Chinese, and Japanese. ThreatFabric has not said whether Bazuka targets specific countries or banks.

Our Take

In our view, what makes Bazuka new is less any single feature than the way it bundles them into one framework and lets an LLM assist with operations in the control panel. If tasks that used to require human effort, such as choosing which devices to target and getting through permission screens, become automated, a small team could potentially run large-scale campaigns.

On the other hand, ThreatFabric says the dropper and modules were not obfuscated, and some control panel APIs returned results without authentication. The framework still appears to be rough around the edges. Even so, because it supports Japanese-language screens, it is hardly irrelevant to Android users in Japan. Basic precautions remain important: avoid installing apps from outside official stores, and refuse unexpected requests to enable Accessibility Services or Wireless Debugging.

Summary

ThreatFabric has published an analysis of Bazuka, an Android fraud framework with 23 modules and a control panel that integrates language models. Android users who install fake apps are the main potential victims. The company sees ADB abuse becoming standard in banking trojans, so the spread of similar techniques deserves attention.