On November 19, 2026, the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) handed down a judgment holding that the government can no longer maintain a "neither confirm nor deny" position on whether the Home Secretary served Apple with a Technical Capability Notice (TCN). The fact that a TCN was given to Apple can now be formally dealt with in the proceedings. The specific contents of the notice, however, have still not been disclosed.

The Tribunal Rejected the Government's National Security Argument

The judgment covers both a claim brought by Apple and a claim brought by four claimants, including the rights groups Privacy International and Liberty. The hearing took place on September 17, 2026, and a three-judge panel led by the Tribunal's President, Lady Carmichael, delivered the decision. The question was whether the Home Secretary could keep up a "neither confirm nor deny" (NCND) response on whether a TCN under section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 had been given to Apple.

The IPT concluded that the government had not established that revealing the TCN would damage national security. It also said it gave no significant weight to the government's own national security assessment. As its reasons, the Tribunal pointed to extensive departures from the NCND principle that had already occurred, including briefings by UK officials to the press and authorized briefings to US officials. In the Tribunal's view, anyone with even a passing interest in the subject already knew the TCN existed.

Only the Existence of the Notice Has Been Made Public

What the judgment makes public is limited to the fact that a TCN was served on Apple. The open version of the judgment does not say what the notice requires, or whether any mechanism to get around Apple's encryption has actually been built. The IPT also issued PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments on the same day, which have not been published.

A TCN is a mechanism under which the government requires communications service providers to maintain technical capabilities so they can assist with warrants. This ruling draws a line on whether the government can keep the very existence of such a notice hidden.

Apple Filed a Second Claim in July 2026

According to the judgment, Apple's first claim was dismissed because of a change of circumstances, and the company brought a new claim in July 2026. The rights groups' claim had been listed for a substantive hearing in December 2026, but the parties now agree that timetable is impractical. Directions are expected to be agreed for a substantive hearing in the first half of 2027.

At that hearing, the substance of the claims will be examined. By allowing the case to proceed on the basis that the notice exists, this ruling sets the starting point for that hearing.

UK Users Still Cannot Newly Turn On Advanced Data Protection

On its support page, Apple says it can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection (ADP) to new users in the United Kingdom. ADP provides end-to-end encryption for 10 iCloud data categories, including iCloud Backup, iCloud Drive, Photos and Notes. Existing UK users who had turned it on will need to disable it themselves within a period of time in order to keep using their iCloud accounts.

Apple says iMessage and FaceTime remain end-to-end encrypted globally, including in the UK, and the 15 iCloud data categories that are end-to-end encrypted by default are not affected. ADP remains available outside the UK, so users in Japan can still enable it as before. However, the support page does not mention the Home Office or a TCN, and Apple has not stated how the ADP withdrawal relates to the TCN.

Our Take

It matters that a secret government order has, at least in terms of its existence, been placed on the record for public debate. Until now, speculation ran ahead while the parties declined to acknowledge anything, leaving companies and users without a shared starting point.

That said, the notice's contents remain hidden, and this ruling does not change anything for users. The unavailability of ADP in the UK is also unchanged as of this writing. Even so, if the substantive hearing expected in the first half of 2027 squarely addresses the claims, it could produce a decision on where to draw the line between encryption and investigative powers that influences debates in other countries as well.

Summary

The UK IPT refused to let the government keep hiding the fact that the Home Secretary served Apple with a TCN. How the case proceeds will be closely watched by iCloud users in the UK and by companies that offer encrypted services. The substantive hearing on the claims is expected to take place in the first half of 2027.