Six researchers from Ruhr University Bochum, Heilbronn University of Applied Sciences, and the University of Wuppertal in Germany have published a paper examining how widely passkeys are used on the web and how securely websites implement them. Titled "The State of Passkeys: Studying the Adoption and Security of Passkeys on the Web," the paper was presented at the 35th USENIX Security Symposium in Baltimore in August 2026. Of the 103 websites the team tested, 18 had critical vulnerabilities that could lead to account takeover and other serious harm. The abstract and full paper are available on the USENIX paper page.

Critical Flaws Found on 18 of 103 Sites

The team built a testing tool called PASSKEYS-ATTACKER. It can manipulate WebAuthn messages, the protocol underlying passkeys, at every step of the exchange, and it bundles 15 attack types. According to the researchers, 10 of those had not been covered by previous work.

Two of the 15 attack types carry a critical CVSS score, the standard measure of vulnerability severity. These two attacks succeeded on 18 of the 103 websites evaluated, putting attackers in a position to take over other users' accounts, delete users' passkeys, or lock users out of their accounts.

The study also found that nearly half of the tested sites, 53 in all, were vulnerable to at least one attack with a high CVSS score. The paper lists phishing and session fixation among the resulting threats.

Analysis of 872 Sites Shows Inconsistent Implementations

The researchers also created PASSKEYS-RADAR, a dataset that tracks passkey deployment on the internet. It combines community-maintained directories of supporting sites, the top 1 million entries of the Tranco site ranking, 18 million entries from CrUX (Chrome usage data), and historical internet archive data, and it has continuously recorded adoption since 2021.

Analyzing the 872 passkey-enabled sites identified through this data, the team found that the procedures for adding and deleting passkeys differ widely from site to site. Some sites also request cryptographic algorithms that are already deprecated. The paper received a Distinguished Paper Award at the symposium.

Passkey Security Depends on Server-Side Verification

Passkeys are a login method based on the FIDO2/WebAuthn standards. A device generates a public and private key pair and registers only the public key with the website. At login, the device signs data with the private key, and the site verifies it with the public key. Unlike passwords, passkeys carry little risk of reuse or leakage, and because they are bound to the legitimate site's domain, they have been considered resistant to phishing.

That protection, however, only holds when the site performs verification exactly as the standard requires. The research targets not the standard itself but the processing that sites carry out at each stage, including registration, login, and deletion. If a site skips checks on signatures or incoming data, loopholes appear no matter how strong the underlying scheme is.

Impact on Users Depends on the Sites They Use

Account takeover, passkey deletion, and lockouts all directly affect users' accounts. At the same time, the problems lie in individual sites' implementations, not in users' devices or passkey manager apps. The abstract published on the USENIX page does not name the specific sites where vulnerabilities were found.

Our Take

In our view, this research is a reminder that passkeys are not a tool that is secure simply by being added, but a mechanism that only works when implemented correctly. As more sites rush to adopt them, the risk grows that sloppy verification or outdated settings will be left in place. Site operators will likely need to review their WebAuthn verification logic and their passkey registration and deletion flows.

It is hard for users to judge the quality of a site's implementation, but that does not mean returning to passwords is the answer. A practical precaution is to check your account settings from time to time for passkeys you do not recognize and to watch for security notices from the services you use. It also helps to confirm the recovery options each service offers in case you lose a passkey.

Summary

The research team led by Ruhr University Bochum analyzed 872 passkey-enabled websites and tested 103 of them against 15 types of attacks. It found critical vulnerabilities that could lead to account takeover and other harm on 18 sites, and weaknesses to high-severity attacks on 53. The security of passkeys depends not only on the standard but also on how carefully each site implements it.